The study examines 
Introduction:
The Shariah governance system i is meant to address a specific type of risk exclusive to Islamic financial institutions (IFIs); the Shariah non-compliance risk ii . The significance of Shariah non-compliance risk to the Islamic finance industry can be illustrated in the case of declining sukuk issuances due to the statement made by the Chairman of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Shariah board, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Fiqh Academy s declaration on the impermissibility of tawarruq, and the Malaysian High Court s judgment on the issue of bay bithaman ajil (BBA). All of these major cases indicate the very significance of Shariah governance system as a risk management tool to mitigate Shariah non-compliance risk (Dusuki, 2011) . The Islamic financial Services Board (IFSB) Guiding Principles on Risk Management (IFSB-1) specifically classifies the Shariah risk as part of the operational risks which can be managed through a sound and proper Shariah governance system (IFSB, 2002) . The Shariah governance system would help IFIs to mitigate Shariah noncompliance risk that may incur unimaginable potential of loss and negate an IFI s credibility. The AAOIFI has taken the initiative to provide basic guidelines for a Shariah governance framework in its governance standards No. 1-5 (AAOIFI, 2005) . Bangladesh Bank (BB), in its guidelines for Islamic banking, has also fixed responsibility for Shariah compliance (BB, 2009) . In this perspective, three questions have been raised here: Is the Shariah governance system of Islamic banks Bangladesh as per AAOIFI standards? What are the levels of compliance with the Shariah Governance Standards of AAOIFI in Islamic banks Bangladesh?Is there any anomaly in the Shariah compliance?
Views expressed are those of the authors own and do not represent in any way the organizations in which they are employed. Therefore the objectives of the study are as follows:
1.
To depict the levels of compliance with the Shariah Governance System of AAOIFI in Islamic banks Bangladesh; 
Significance
The philosophical foundation of corporate governance in Islam requires an additional layer of governance for the purpose of Shariah compliance. With this aspiration, corporate governance in IFIs needs a set of institutional arrangements to oversee the Shariah compliance aspect of their business and operations. In the absence of a specific model of corporate governance in Islamic literatures, the Shariah governance system was introduced to complement the existing corporate governance framework in IFIs. In this regard, a Shariah governance system is peculiarly exclusive and unique to the corporate governance framework in IFIs, unlike their conventional counterparts (Dusuki, 2011) .
In parallel with the growth of the Islamic finance sector in Bangladesh and worldwide; and the complexity of duty and responsibility of the Shariah board towards different stakeholders, it is strongly indicated that there must be a sound and proper Shariah governance system. The Shariah governance system enhances and strengthens the function of the Shariah board and its related institution for the purpose of Shariah compliance.
Shariah governance is a unique kind of governance in financial architecture as it is concerned with the religious aspects of the overall activities of IFIs. The existing standard setting agencies such as the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Organisation and Securities Commission (IOSCO) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have issued numerous guidelines on governance and risk management for financial institutions. The OECD has issued Guidelines on Corporate Governance, the IOSCO on capital market and the BCBS on Basel Committee I, II and III. Nevertheless these standards and guidelines failed to address specific issues of Islamic finance (Dusuki, 2011) .
As the nature and model of Islamic finance are different with the conventional counterparts, the need for a standard-setting agency specifically for the Islamic finance was crucial and hence, with the initiative of several IFIs and regulatory authorities, the AAOIFI and the IFSB were established in 1992 and 2004 respectively. The AAOIFI has issued five governance standards while the IFSB has issued three Prudential Standards and one guiding principles on the governance in IFIs.
The difference between the IFSB Prudential Standards and the AAOIFI Governance Standards is that the IFSB approach is more concerned towards regulators while the AAOIFI, to individual IFIs (Dusuki, 2011) . The study therefore has been undertaken, based on the AAOFI standards, to make a study on the Shariah governance system of individual commercial banks of Bangladesh.
Methodology and scope
A list of the banks under study is given in appendix B2: banks which are not full-fledged Islamic but operate Islamic banking through some Islamic bank branches, and (iii) B3: banks operate Islamic banking through some windows. The findings therefore would reflect the levels of Shariah compliance with the standards of Shariah governance system of AAOIFI. The study used content analysis to assess compliance with five standards of AAOIFI on Shariah governance of Islamic banks Bangladesh. Content analysis is a way to categorise various items of a document into a number of categories. It is an appropriate method to use where a large amount of qualitative data to be analysed. The use of content analysis has been supported by a number of authors for similar type of research (Boyatis, 1998; Krippendorf, 1980) . It may be mentioned here that the main issue in content analysis is reliability. Milne and Alder (1999) identified different types of reliability and this occurs in the process of coding. The main problem that arises in coding is when more than one code is encoding the data. In the study, there are only five standards of Shariah governance system and 7 Islamic banking companies Bangladesh are involved. The five Shariah governance standards of AAOIFI addressed in the study are: In order to conduct the study, secondary data were collected from the annual reports of the banks under study. Annual reports for the year 2011 were collected from the head offices of the banks. In order to address the standards of Shariah governance system of Islamic banks Bangladesh, the five standards of AAOIFI has also been referred. Data of respective banks were analysed and compared with the requirements of the standards to interpret the findings. Without coding the five standards, the authors conducted a sentence by sentence analysis to determine compliance in the line of the methods used by Shrives and Linsley (2003) . To analyse find the limitations of the Shariah Supervisory Committees (SSCs), the annual reports 2011 of seven fullfledged Islamic banks have been studied carefully.
Literature Review and hypothesis
To develop a hypothesis of the study following literature has been reviewed:
Choudhury (2006) examined the mind-set of Islamic economics and finance organisations to show that the pursuit of capitalist globalisation is deep in their agenda. Thereby a narrow (Fiqhi) interpretation of the Shariah is followed, leaving aside the Tawhidi core. Much needs to be done along both the conceptual and applied perspectives of the Islamic worldview in economy, finance, society and the socioscientific entirety. Hassan and Chachi (2008) investigated the practices of corporate governance of Islamic financial service industry in Brunei Darussalam with a view to assess the level of compliance. The study has also focused the role of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) and how it adds value to the Board of Directors as well as to the corporate governance in the context of the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). The main aim of this study was to bring in the research arena the state of corporate governance in the Islamic financial institutions in Brunei Darussalam drawing data from Islamic banks and Islamic Takaful companies. Iqbal (2005) found that there is lack of uniformity in the religious principles applied in Islamic countries. In the absence of a universally accepted central religious authority, Islamic banks have formed their own religious boards for guidance. Islamic banks have to consult their respective religious boards, or Shariah advisors, to seek approval for each new instrument. Differences in interpretation of Islamic principles by different schools of thought may mean that identical financial instruments are rejected by one board but accepted by another. Thus the same instrument may not be acceptable in all countries. This problem can be addressed by forming a uniform council representing different schools of thought to define cohesive rules and to expedite the process of introducing new products. Kayed and Mohammed (2009) argues that implementing Al Shariah compliant guidelines and procedures devised from the principle of Islamic finance would be an effective instrument in controlling these risks like systematic risks (the possibility of financial system or institution to collapse or fall down), credit risks ( bad loans) and market risks (currency fluctuation) of Islamic modes of finance. Pellegrini (2007) reviews Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS) corporate governance (CG) challenges and suggests options to address them. He first pointed out the importance of corporate governance for institutions offering Islamic financial services, where it would require a distinct treatment from convention corporate governance and highlights three cases of distress of IIFS. He concluded that poor CG can carry heavy financial costs for IIFS stakeholders. In addition, poor governance in IIFS would undermine their credibility as financial businesses offering services in compliance with Shariah. Given the fledging nature of the sector and its ethical foundations, the effects of a CG failure could be particularly damaging. Sarker (2005) observed that in many cases, Shariah Councils of Islamic banks Bangladesh were disappointed at the inordinate delay in Shariah Implementation in the banking transactions or unwillingness to follow Shariah guidelines in banks by both the owners and management of the banks.
The review indicates that none of the authors studied the compliance of Islamic banks with Shariah governance system of AAOFI keeping in view the banking growth. It has been therefore hypothesised that if there is more compliance with Shariah so there shall be higher growth of Islamic banking. It appears that the study is virgin and shall contribute in the Islamic finance and banking literature.
Limitations
The study does not cover the state owned banks like Sonali, Agrani, and other private banks which have Islamic banking branches, windows or parallel system of Islamic banking due to non availability of data because these banks started Islamic banking recently. The study also does not cover some foreign banks which operate banking in Bangladesh and have Islamic bank branches or windows, as their annual reports are not available here. In future a study may be undertaken covering those banks.
Analysis and findings
It has been observed that there are 18 required issues, of the five standards of Shariah governance system of AAOIFI, to comply by the IFIs. Those are given in table 1: To depict the levels of compliance of Islamic banks Bangladesh with the issues of Shariah Governance System of AAOIF as mentioned above, collected data have been analysed in the following tables. Table 2 represents the Shariah compliance levels of B1 banks in the year 2011. The average compliance level is 85%. All banks comply, more or less, with the requirements of all standards but standard 4 only. The highest compliance level is 89%, which is achieved by only three out of seven banks, namely IBBL, SIBL and FSIB. On the other hand, the lowest compliance level is 78% which is achieved only by Al-Arafah. Table 3 depicts the compliance levels of B2 banks. Like B1 banks, all B2 banks also comply more or less with the requirements of all standards but standard 4 only. The average compliance level is 81% and the highest compliance level is 83%. Both of these are less than that of B1 banks. But the lowest compliance level is same. However, the highest level is achieved by only three out of six banks, namely ABL, SEBL and Dhaka bank. On the other hand, the lowest level is complied also by three banks, namely Prime, Primier and Jamuna bank. One can understand the compliance levels of B3 banks reading table 4. All banks do not comply with all the standards. The average compliance level is 60%, which is less than those of both the banks B1 and B2. The highest compliance level is 83% which is complied by AB bank and the lowest compliance level is 17% which is achieved by Standard bank. All compliance levels i.e. highest, lowest and average of B3 banks are less than that of the banks B1 and B2. Table 5 shows comparative levels of the banks B1, B2 and B3. Representing the table 5, graph 1 shows that the average level is highly decreased in case of B3 banks. The analysis of standard deviation (STD) shows that the volatility of the level of B3 banks have also been increased i.e. compliance level of the B3 banks has not been developed like banks B1 and B2. On the other hand, there is a little difference between banks B1 and B2 against both mean and standard deviation. (Siddiqui, 2006) .
Only a bank mentioned that a library has been established in the Shariah
Council Secretariat having about 500 books on Quran, Hadith, Fiqh, Islamic economics and banking. Honourable members of the Council learn Shariah issues and guidelines to run the Bank s operations. They take necessary consultations and data from those books and conduct research and study. No other banks have been found reported with such a necessary backup in terms of fundamental research. But it is necessary because the trend of focusing on duplicating conventional financial products through a kind of Islamic financial engineering started in nineteen nineties and came to dominate the scheme in the new century. The most important areas seem to be sukuk (duplicating bonds) and tawarauq (duplicating bank-loans).
3. Some banks pave the way for independent opinions and suggestions of the SSC forming the SSC with the outsiders only. Their reports have been found transparent because those were presented under two major heads like i) Opinions, and ii) Suggestions. On the other hand, some banks formed the SSC with both outsiders and insiders. The Chairman, Vice Chairman, Director, CEO, inter alia, have been found as insiders. In a bank, there are 7 insiders out of 11 members of the SSC. Appointment of insiders in the SSC is a deviation from the AAOIFI standards 1(e) & 5(a).
4. Reports of the SSC have been presented in different ways, such as, some banks mentioned the issue of Zakat payment by the bank and the others remained silent. Stakeholders are generally interested to know whether the Islamic bank deduct the Zakat Payable by the depositors and shareholders from their accounts or not.
5. Compensation realized and interest incomes are two components of doubtful income of an Islamic bank. The SSC finds the amount of doubtful income important to indicate operational efficiency of Shariah based bank. But some reports of the SSC of the banks under study, did not mention the amount of doubtful income at all, although some of them mentioned it, only one bank detailed its doubtful income. a. The internal Shariah review carried out by an independent department or part of internal audit division b. The management and the BOD gave full and continuous support to the internal shariah reviewers c. Head of internal shariah reviewers is accountable to BOD d. The internal shariah reviewer is proficient and have appropriate academic background and necessary training relevant to shariah review, particularly proficiency in shariah and fiqh muamalat. e. The head of the internal shariah review to discuss the findings with the management and the final report must be addressed to the BODs and copied to the shariah board and management. f. In the event of disputes between management and internal shariah reviewers, they are referred to the shariah board for determination. 
